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in this drama conjecture has not been idle; the weak part is variously supposed to have been written by the poet in his youth, or in a bad mood, or not at all by him but by some other playwright or playwrights. It is perhaps immaterial which view is adopted, they have all quite the same degree of probability, and rest upon equally good evidence.

KANT'S ETHICS.

BY JAMES EDMUNDS.

[Continued from Vol. VIII., p. 351].

VI. — *Ethical Worship.*

§101—As the lightning that lightens out of the one part under heaven shines unto the other part under heaven, so does the Kantian doctrine of the indefinite series illumine the whole universe. All phenomena lie in series of indefinite extent: and the completion of every series is THE INFINITE, “for in Him we live and move and have our being, as also some of your own poets have said.” All antinomies consist just herein:* that the human understanding cannot determine the relation of THE INFINITE to any given series (§78); and the indifference of every antinomy, sole indubitable deliverance of every reason, is THE INFINITE.

§102—All thought proceeds in a sensible series, a series therefore *a priori* infinitely divisible and infinitely protensible. Consciousness, “needed conditionally only to make the perception clearer or more perspicuous” (KANT'S Religion, book IV., apotome II., section IV.), whether regressing, progressing, or envisaging, finds in this series that INFINITY, which is moreover required to constitute that unity without which consciousness were itself impossible (§§16, 98).

§103—Hence, according to the most enlightened philosophy no less than the common understanding, ethic issues naturally and

*The proper place for the proof of this is the transcendental dialectic, which clears illusions and fallacies out of the way of those practical principles upon which alone ethics and religion are securely founded.

inevitably in religion. The DIVINE IDEAL, hypostatized and throned in the field of the supernatural, occupies no doubtful place, but holds and verily is the solid substratum of all understanding, the omnipresent indifference of the ceaseless antiphony of nature. The synthesis is transcendent and the representation anthropomorphic: the IDEAL can therefore be objected solely for a practical behoof: but that subjective use which cures all the imperfections of the world of woful sense quite consists with and consoles the self-prescribed limitations of the understanding.

§104—Anthropomorphism is of the very essence of all rational representation. Not anthropomorphism is obnoxious to philosophy, but only irrational inferences from anthropomorphic syntheses: *ex gratia*, the postulation of an indemonstrable reality. Uncultivated reason, ever seeking the hidden springs of her venerated law, continually overleaps herself, incautiously climbing upon the drifting clouds of hyper-physical worlds. True religion need not so much restrain as instruct and regulate ethical ambition. Philosophy, eradicating unwarrantable inductions and pruning away fallacious fancies, retains the supreme central thoughts of anthropomorphism intact and sacrosanct, perennial source whence are deduced faith, hope, and everlasting love.

§105—The reverence inspired by the unconditioned law may at the will of the law's subject be directed upon the law's last end and aim, the DIVINE IDEAL (§97). Answering to the contemplative call, like magnetic current from opposing pole, the PEACE OF GOD (§87), as it were a dove descended out of heaven, comes upon the head of the bowed worshiper and there abides, ravishing his soul with supernal grace, the while purifying his secret thought and renovating his corrupted will. The blessed influence melts the cold intellectual reverence into a sensible tenderness, so wondrously analogous to human love, so inexhaustible, so infinite in delight, so unspeakably precious, that astonishment is no longer felt in hearing the delirious song of SPINOZA*: "the love wherewith His creatures love one another is the love wherewith GOD loveth Himself."

§106—It were manifestly useless to search the physical world for the originary springs of voluntary action. The spontaneous volition, although eventuating in time, is itself no phenomenon

*BENEDICTUS, qui venit in nomine Domini.

and cannot be subjected to the law of the causal nexus. Since we know no other law of causation, we can only subsume under bare principles the will's conformity or nonconformity to the pure law of reason (§58). We therefore predicate an unsearchable hyper-physical subjective ground of adopting maxims ordaining obedience to the supersensible law, which ground may be called man's connate predisposition for righteousness, or his good principle: and likewise a subjective bias, also hyper-physical and inscrutable, "whereby the choice leans to maxims that postpone the spring afforded by the moral law in favor of other and immoral springs," which bias may be called man's depravity, or his evil principle.

Both predisposition and bias must be regarded as distinct from the will, which freely adopts the one or the other as its last governing ground or spring.

§107—It seems scarcely necessary to add that the evil principle is as rational and necessary a postulate as the good*. For if it be contended with regard to any action that the ground (whether physical or hyper-physical) of the determination of the choice does not lie within the reason of the subject himself (see the definition of appetite, §45), it must be conceded that that ground (whatsoever) has been by the will freely adopted as mobile, which free adoption can only take place by virtue of a maxim subsumed under the will's supreme rule. For the supremacy of reason practical (§§23, 47), were an idle dream, were not the universal validity of her law self-declared and obedience unconditionally commanded (§§ 56, 58). Any violation of the law can only be in pursuance of a predetermined maxim negating the law's supremacy; which supremacy cannot be defeated unless the last subjective ground (manifestly hyper-physical and inscrutable) of adopting the vicious maxim has been already made the supreme rule of conduct. (It is not meant here to deny that the good principle may practically cover a subsidiary rule which may have erected into a spring an end which AS END is right and just but AS SPRING immoral. §84 et supra. But such impurity of motive is itself offensive and imputable).

*"I find then the law, that when I desire to do good, evil is present with me. For I delight in the law of GOD after the inward man. But I see ANOTHER LAW in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members."—*Paul to the Romans.*

§108—We have termed the good principle man's predisposition for righteousness, and the bad principle man's bias to evil. By the term "bias," KANT understands "The subjective ground of the possibility of acquiring all at once inveterate habits, so far forth as such habitual desire is in itself only adventitious and casually superinduced upon human nature." "Since evil can arise only from a perverse determination of one's free choice, which choice again can only be deemed good or evil when regard is had to the maxims it has adopted, it follows that the bias to evil can only consist in the subjective ground of the possibility of an agent-intelligent's maxims swerving from the moral law," which ground is voluntarily adopted by the agent as his supreme rule.

The answer to the natural question, "How then is the law alone and always supreme?" is found in the difference between natural and moral necessitation. For the upright man, the law of GOD BOTH IS AND OUGHT TO BE the supreme rule; while he who IS GOVERNED by the evil principle, OUGHT NEVERTHELESS TO OBEY the law which ever declares to him its rightful supremacy.

Hence arises the propriety of distinguishing the good principle as a predisposition, of necessity prereduced toward the possibility of man's being precisely what he is, from the evil principle as a bias, as matter of acquisition, entailed by the man upon himself. The distinction is a valuable addition to the ethical ascetic, though it is nothing but a logical enforcement of the ethical OUGHT. (§77).

§109—Why we are born into the flesh subject to an ineradicable bias perverting the moral spring afforded by the pure law, is a problem which lies beyond the bounds of understanding; since the material benefits of subordination to the law would as surely flow from necessitation as from free conformity. But it is cogitable that the evil principle is implanted by the LAWGIVER, in order that the necessity of the principle of good*, being incessantly thrust forward (§89), may continuously direct His creatures to Himself (§96). In this view (which, though transcendent, is not constitutive, but merely affords a grateful contemplation),

*"We have this treasure in earthen vessels, that the exceeding greatness of the power may be GOD'S and not of us," says PAUL.

the two principles may be regarded as connate and essentially coexistent.

§110—Man's "susceptibility for such reverence toward the moral law as is of itself sufficient to make the law the immediate spring of will," is the subjective ground of the possibility of his intelligible character, so far forth as this character can be apprehended by the merely human reason. KANT calls it his "predisposition for personality," by which last he signifies the naked idea of the moral law. But, if this were so, with the solution of the antinomy would personality quite fall away. Holiness, for a merely practical behoof, an invaluable cogitation, annihilates the conception of the law in the fulfilment thereof; and reason forbids the assertion that by no increment or evolution can she replace her present supreme law by a higher mobile*. (§43).

But except upon unattainable hyper-physical ground, it must be held that both principles, predisposition and bias alike, are ineradicable.

§111—According as the one or the other principle is voluntarily made the last ground of choice, is man morally either good or bad. And since as an individual intelligent it is impossible that he should at the same time be governed by two conflicting supreme rules, he must be esteemed at every point of time either wholly good or wholly bad.† For that upright or this perverse mindedness he is at all times strictly accountable, having as a free agent wilfully adopted the supreme motive in accordance with which his maxims are determined; and the good or evil consequences therefrom flowing, are at all times justly imputable.

But when we come to consider him as a phenomenon, whose intelligible character is strangely compounded with the complexity of nature, we discover that in actual fact and event he is so swayed by an impurity of commingled motive that at no moment of his physical existence is he able to conclude with certainty

*But the fact that a superior faculty may exist without reason, does not concern the argument, which is not addressed to angels. Its weight appears in the transcendental dialectic.

†"For is he in any one point morally good, then has he made the moral law his maxim; but should he at the same time be in some other points bad, then, since the moral law is but one and yet universal, the maxim referring to it would be at once a general and a particular maxim, which is a contradiction."
—*Kant's Religion, Book I., explanatory scholium to the exordium.*

upon his supreme rule. He must therefore at every point of time be esteemed neither wholly good nor wholly bad, but frail and corrupt, continually deflecting from that his proper standard of holiness which reason incessantly plants in the forefront of the battle of this mortal life.

§112—He who has adopted the evil principle as his supreme rule, may nevertheless during the whole course of his physical existence exhibit only just actions, strictly conformed to the outward requirements of the law. But when the choice is determined to good deeds by merely evil maxims, which last “might possibly just as easily invite to transgression,” the character contains no moral worth.* The term DEED or ACT, says KANT, “may signify that primordial use of freedom whereby the supreme and ruling maxim (contrary to, or in harmony with, the law) was determined on, or it may equally well denote that derived exercise of will whereby outward actions themselves (acts materially considered, so far forth as they are objects of choice) are actually brought forth conformably to such maxim. The indwelling bias toward evil is a deed in the former sense (PECCATUM ORIGINARIUM), and at the same time the formal ground of every illegal deed in the second sense (PECCATUM DERIVATIVUM). The guilty demerit of the first subsists even while that of the second is most carefully and successfully eschewed by dint of springs differing from the law. The one is A DEED COGITABLE, patent to reason *a priori*, independently of all conditions of time; the other is A DEED SENSIBLE, *a posteriori*, exhibited in time (FACTUM PHENOMENON)”.

§113—The ground of evil does not lie in the sensory, but in that immoral mindedness whereby the law is not at all times made the supreme rule. True virtue, therefore, wars upon appetite only so far as this last contravenes the law (§86). The sensuous appetites are in themselves neither good nor bad: they are merely the media through which appears the goodness or badness of the man. The springs taken from sense may be the sufficient determinators of every act; and that they are permitted so to be, irrespective of the law, is precisely what makes man morally evil. “Appetites do no more than throw difficulties in the way of EXECUTING maxims that may happen to thwart them: whereas evil consists properly herein—that mankind WILLS not

*LUKE XVIII., 1-5.

to withstand those appetites when these last [maxims] invite to transgression; which evil mindedness it is strictly, that is the true inward enemy."

§114—Man cannot escape from the law, which by force of his moral nature thrusts itself unremittently upon him; he therefore does, whether consciously or unconsciously (more often the latter), adopt into his maxims springs taken from the law. Neither can (nor ought) he eradicate his sensuous impulses; hence his physical nature compels the adoption also of the springs of sense. It is therefore evident that if the moral quality of his maxims depends upon the DIFFERENCE OF THE SPRINGS which they contain (which may be called the MATTER of the maxims), he is at once both morally good and morally evil, which is a contradiction (as regards a single consciousness, and can only be predicated of an aggregate). It follows that that whereby a man is morally good or morally evil depends solely upon the SUBORDINATION OF THE SPRINGS (adopted by him into his maxims, which may be called the FORM of the maxims): "WHICH ONE HE CHOOSES TO MAKE THE CONDITION OF THE OTHERS." (§94).

§115—The supreme duty of every man, at every moment of his physical existence, therefore is **now, by an instantaneous act of will, to reinstate the good principle in its original supremacy** as the highest rule of his life, stating it in his maxims as at all times the sole and sufficient condition of all the springs of the will. What manner of life hence results may be in general inferred from the deduction of the ethical principle (chapter IV. *supra*; or the same may be extensively gathered from the didactic of the New Testament, while the historic portions of that scripture sufficiently illustrate the ethical ascetic).

By this constant reinstatement of the law, which may be called "a transvolving of the cast of thinking." "when by one single inflexible determination mankind retroverts his will's perverted bias for choosing evil maxims," is the evil principle (not eradicated, but) continually outweighed. More than this is not within human power; for evil could only be extirpated by force of maxims WHOLLY good, and these can never be adopted by man, whose last subjective ground of choice is already radically corrupted.

§116—And it is by reason of this his natural depravity that no man is able to declare with certainty (even to himself, much less to others), whether that good resolution does in strict conformity

to the law dominate his thought, and does thereby so far reform the bent of his sensory as to bring forth into act "fruit worthy of repentance." (§89). The fixity of his principle can only be INFERRED from the careful observation of a long course of conduct. But whatever the law ordains that he OUGHT TO DO, that is he entitled by his reason to believe that he CAN DO. He may therefore well hope that the good principle, "chosen as his dominant rule of life, will suffice to keep him unswervingly steady along the good though narrow railway of a perpetual progression from bad to better. This progression is for Him to whom the unknown depths of the heart are patent, and in whose ALL-SEEING EYE the moments of the series are envisaged in their sum, an integral unity," completely satisfying the sacrosanct requirements of His most holy law.

"I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, to present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, well-pleasing to God, which is YOUR RATIONAL SERVICE. And be not conformed to this world; but BE TRANSFORMED BY THE RENEWING OF YOUR MIND, that you may discern what is the will of GOD, the good, and well-pleasing, and perfect." So PAUL of this matter.

Heed also JAMES THE JUST: "But be DOERS of the word, and not hearers only (deceiving yourselves). For if any one is a hearer of the word, and not a doer, he is like to a man beholding his natural face in a mirror. For he beheld himself, and has gone away; and immediately he forgot what manner of man he was. But he who looked into THE PERFECT LAW, THE LAW OF LIBERTY, and remained thereby, being not a forgetful hearer, but A DOER OF WORK, this man shall be happy in his doing."

§117—Against the proposal to man's self of the self-amelioration unconditionally by the law commanded (§91), it can by no means be objected that the HABITS of depravity (whether inherited, or self-imposed, or by any power physical or hyperphysical) present insuperable obstructions; "for by no cause in the world can he ever cease to be a free, *id est* a spontaneously acting being." No physical forces (whether entirely without, or also within man) can determine a free act; and to resolve upon the doing of any wicked deed, under no matter what pressure of circumstance, is "an ordinary use of choice." Moreover, to know the relation of his every act to the law is the duty of every rational agent; and to permit himself to be hurried without due reflection into sin (of commission) is itself sin (of omission) no

less imputable than deliberate wickedness. Whether the consequences of former free immoral acts may be entirely overcome by immediate transvolution of choice and incessant inflexibility of will, or must henceforth be endured (the PUNISHMENT of past guilt, inflicted by inexorable law), is a question which cannot be entertained; because it is the instant duty of man NOW to amend, and any delay or refusal whatever is just as much a transgression as though he were now for the first time falling out of a state of original innocence into evil.

§118—In consequence of his connate principle of evil, man cannot go forward in an upright life, as though he were by nature innocent; nor, in presence of his connate principle of good, ought he, as though hopelessly wicked, supinely to await supernatural regeneration, imploring with tears that that may be done for him which it behooves him instantly to do for himself. He must begin by counteracting (§82) his perverted choice, "and (because the bias to evil is ineradicable) by unremittingly wrestling, and so making stand against it. Since now this issues in an endless progress from bad to better, it results that the converting of the sentiments of the wicked into those of the good takes place by so changing the innermost and last ground whereupon maxims of life are determined on, that these last [maxims] become henceforward conformable to the law." The COMPREHENSIBILITY of such a change is beyond the reach of understanding (which indeed cannot explain any event into time, but must content itself with arranging under laws those events which it apprehends); but so far as concerns the POSSIBILITY, let him who deems it advisable to co-act the representation of the law consult the examples of the illustrious dead. (§§80, 92).

§119—But having done what he can for himself, and steadfastly continuing in the doing, man is entitled by his reason to believe that the law will not fail of completion. "For verily I say to you, till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall not pass from the law, till all be fulfilled." He may therefore (and in truth inevitable does) HOPE that whatever HELP (whether natural or supernatural, whether merely external aids or also within himself) may be needful to obviate the obstructions which beset his course, to subdue opposing circumstances, and so to conduce to his ultimate well-being, will (without price) be added to him. (§103). To understand either wherein this WORK OF GRACE consists or whether it be possible or indeed exist at all, cannot assist

him either in the performance of his own duty or in the knowledge of the law. "It is not essential," says KANT, "and consequently not necessary, for EVERY ONE to know what GOD does or may already have done for his salvation; but it is undoubtedly requisite that all should know WHAT THEY THEMSELVES HAVE TO DO in order to render themselves worthy of His aid."

And so is the series of finite phenomenal actions, morally considered, though faulty and imperfect at every point of time, at last (like every other indefinite series) made perfect by the glorious completeness of the INFINITE.*

§120—In all these things we are more than conquerors through Him who loved us. For I am persuaded that neither death nor life; neither angels nor principalities nor powers, neither things present nor things to come, neither height nor depth, nor any other created thing, shall be able to separate us from the love of GOD. And now remain faith, hope, love, these three; and the greatest of these is love. Pursue after love. Love works no ill to one's neighbor; therefore love is the fulfilment of the law.

"Now faith is the assurance* of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen." And the faith which ASSURES us that whatever aid (physical, hyperphysical, or supernatural) may be needful to eke out the imperfections of man (who must invariably account himself to have come short of the glory of GOD) may be made available by a good will, though all the while totally unacquainted with the matter," does moreover give rise to a CONVICTION OF THE GRACE of GOD which cannot be shaken by any assaults from without, nay also or from within, so long as the path of an upright life is rigidly pursued. This faith (FIDES SACRA), being the pure reflex of speculative reason, subjective and not constitutive, is well-grounded, and cannot properly be called superstitious. Unlike (and exactly reversing the course of) dogmatic faith (FIDES IMPERATA, SERVILIS), it comes from beyond (EX TERRA INCOGNITA), a light into the world, solely that the

*The superficial reader will observe that this is Universalism. It is indeed universal completion—of salvation of them that obey, and no less of damnation of them that refuse. For as many as sin with the law shall be judged by the law; and he who apes the perfection of the devil will necessarily expect to find (in precise accordance with the law) the series ultimately closed by infinite degradation.

†The version of King JAMES is ridiculous. Vide Hebrews XI., 1.

world may not abide in darkness. Beatific handmaid of blessed love!

§121—Through faith we perceive, then, that works of grace are possible, and if real may inure to our need. But the voice of reason forbids us either to transcend our limited knowledge of nature, vaingloriously presuming that the boundless mercy of the MOST HIGH hath wrought in our behalf any work of grace, or foolishly to stray into the realm of the hyperphysical, where our feet have no foothold and our lamps no oil. As to that fanaticism, neither the immediate witness of conscience nor the deductions of observation and experience can possibly afford any man any warrant to assert that he in his own person exhibits a preternatural effect of the Divine Benignity, or anything further than the legitimate sequent of his own previous action; while as to this folly, the boldest pretender to insight can never demonstrate that the works of those gone before have not followed them, constituting there as here the sole external title to character.

And furthermore: he who seeks by any means whatsoever to bring about within himself a work of grace, does thereby delude himself; since he is required by his reason to look for none other than natural effects from those natural means which alone are within his power. And if, in this delusive evagation from the bounds of understanding, he pretermits in favor of any supposititious thaumaturgy any part of his rational service, he is therein guilty of a heathenish worship which cannot advance his moral amendment, and must infallibly repress the spirit of true devotion.

By faith (apart from works of law) we reckon that man is justified. Do we then make void law through the faith? Far be it! Yea, we establish law.

§122—Out of "our consciousness of the moral law, coupled with the need felt by reason of assuming somewhere a higher power able to procure to that law whatever whole and entire effect a created universe will admit of, and to make that effect conspire and harmonize with the moral scope of all things, comes forth the hypostasis of the DIVINE IDEAL as the Supreme Governor of His universe, King of kings and Lord of lords. We cannot concern ourselves with transcendent theology (as to what GOD may be, objectively: §16, parenthesis), but only with the relations which the Rational Ideal bears to us as rational agents,

and with our duty in view of that Ideal. Those relations may be conveniently arranged under the threefold aspect of legislative, executive, and judicial, (regarding OUR FATHER as Omnipotent Creator, Benignant Guardian, and Righteous Judge); and this duty is the acknowledgement, recognition and performance of all our obligations as if they were divine commandments." "And the scribe said to him, 'Well, teacher; thou saidst truly that He is One, and there is no other beside Him: and to love Him with all the heart and with all the understanding and with all the soul and with all the strength, and to love his neighbor as himself [§70, 84], is more than all the whole burnt offerings and sacrifices.' And JESUS, seeing that he answered intelligently, said to him, 'Thou art not far from the kingdom of-GOD.'"

§123—So that the religion of reason differs from theologies, revelations, and statutable confessions, as subjective from objective, as ideal from imaginative. The objective phase of the only true religion is in the realization of its practical principles, whereof the inculcation is conveyed in the didactic of ethics, and whose application is itself the ethical ascetic. "Everything mankind fancies he can do, over and above good moral conduct, in order to make himself acceptable to GOD, is mere false worship of the Deity." "The true worship of GOD, rendered by the ethical believer (at once a subject in the Divine realm, and at the same time a free denizen of the moral state), is (like the heavenly kingdom) itself invisible, an inward service of the heart, consisting in the spirit and truth of a real moral sentiment within; and this service can alone consist in that moral-mindedness which discharges all the incumbent offices of humanity as if they were Divine commandments."

§124—The careful student, who has followed the master in philosophy from the first contact of the rational faculty with the sensory, thence through the schematism of the understanding up to ABSOLUTE UNITY (§§16; 24, 96—7—8), thence again returning in a complete deduction with THE LAW OF LIFE, a law whose utmost speculative reach leaves no nook of the universe unexplored and whose practical application leaves no need of man's moral nature unsatisfied, requires now no further assurance that the TRANSCENDENTAL SYSTEM OF KANT is one single and complete whole and positive (§100), negating only the Hegelians and the Philistines. The architectonic resurvey of the entire philosophic domain lately traversed now exhibits the landmarks then hast-

ily cast up free from any shadow of doubt, and does thereby (for if a trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself for battle?) mightily embolden valor (§86) to take on the whole armor of GOD, that he may be able to withstand in the evil day, and having fully done all, to stand. (§118). For GOD is able to make him stand.

§125—It remains to observe that religion issues out of ethic, and cannot in the rational procession precede it. And here, because by no rescript of our own can we add force to the master's words, or improve the matchless elegance of SEMPLE'S English version, we conclude by inviting the reader's most punctual attention to one of the great KANT'S grandest climaxes:

"There is a practical knowledge based entirely upon reason, needing no historic authentication, lying so near every one, even the most simple, that it looks as had it been written in detail on the tablets of his heart: a practical knowledge I say, of a law that cannot be named without commanding universal assent to its authority, and which is ushered into every one's soul with the IMMEDIATE consciousness of its unconditioned obligatory force. This practical knowledge is besides sufficient of itself to guide to a belief in GOD; or should this belief have been suggested aliunde, then it fixes and defines our idea of Him as a moral law-giver; thus furnishing a religion that is at once comprehensible by all, and that puts on the greatest dignity and honor that can possibly be represented; nay, the above mentioned practical knowledge issues so naturally in this religion, that it admits of being questioned Socratically out of every person's understanding, although he had never heard of it before. It is consequently not merely expedient to commence with this obvious truth, and to make the historical belief wherewith it is so much in harmony follow only as an accessory: but it is even a very duty to regard those notices, the birthright of every human reason, as the principal and supreme index pointing out the only legitimate and infallible way through which we can become partakers of whatever bliss a historical belief may promise: for in truth we can allow a narrated creed to pass validly current to such extent only as the former [practical knowledge] warrants; whereas, whenever this search into its inner texture and contents has been warily gone about, then is THE ETHICAL BELIEVER always left fully open to make a transit to so much of THE HISTORICAL BELIEF as he may find conducive to the quickening and enlivening of his pure moral and religious sentiments, in which event alone can such belief possess any inward moral worth, as it is then free and unextorted by any threat.

"There is yet another question which may be asked: whether the lectures publicly delivered in a church ought mainly to set

forth doctrines of GODLINESS, or those of pure VIRTUE. The former term (*godliness*) is perhaps the only one still used that can convey (even in part) the meaning of the foreign term *religio*.

"GODLINESS may be figured as containing under it two different moods in regard to our relation to the Deity. FEAR OF GOD is such a cast of thinking as obtains when we observe GOD'S LAWS as SUBJECTS in His realm, id est from the awe of duty. LOVE OF GOD, on the other hand, obtains then, when we offer Him the obedience of dutiful children, id est from a free and ingenuous approbation taken in His law. Either frame of mind is consequently above and beyond the bare moral determination, accompanied by the attendant idea of a supersensible Being, invested with such attributes as may be needed for placing within our reach that *sovereign good* aimed at by a moral mind, and eking out our inability to realize and attain it. This Person's *nature* does, whenever attempted to be fixed by any predicate, save those immediately arising out of the moral relation perceived to obtain betwixt our *idea* of Him and our duty, stand always in the greatest hazard of being anthropomorphously distorted, and consequently of endangering, displacing, and even supplanting to that extent our moral sentiments. Accordingly, we saw in the *Critiques* that this idea could not be received as of objective validity by pure speculative Reason, and that its origin, and still more its main use, was grounded entirely on the self-begotten and self-upholding law of our ethical economy. This being the state of matters, what, it will naturally be asked, ought to constitute the first rudiments of instruction when addressing the young, or when prelecting from the pulpit? Ought *virtue* to be explained before *godliness*? or godliness in preference to, and perhaps without even so much as mentioning, *virtue*? Both go of necessity hand-in-hand together: but a necessary conjunction of this sort can only obtain where the one is *the end*, the other no more than *a mean*. Again, the whole theory of virtue has its complete and entire subsistence by itself, dispensing even with the Idea God; whereas tenets of godliness deal only with this idea, so far forth as it serves to depicture to us how the grand end of morality (viz. the sovereign good) is to be gained. Hence it is manifest that godliness cannot *by itself* be the aim and end of morality, but can only serve as a mean, strengthening mankind's honest-mindedness, by ascertaining and warranting to him every good, even holiness, for which his natural efforts might be insufficient. The Idea Virtue, on the contrary, is exculpated in most prominent relief on every human soul. Each man bears it fully about within, however it may for a while be partially submerged; nor does it need, like the religious Idea, to be arrived at through any chain of ratiocination. In the august magnificence of its purity, arousing consciousness forthwith to the discovery of an otherwise quite unsuspected energy, empowering man to smite down and overthrow the greatest possible obstacles within; in the dignity

of his nature which mankind has to uphold inviolate in order to reach that moral destination after which he strives; in this recognition of his excellency and purity, there does, I say, lie something so soul-exalting, yea heavenwards wafting, placing mankind as it were even in the presence of the Deity (§99), who merely by His holiness and legislative guardianship of virtue is an object of adoration, that every man, even though as yet far removed from giving this idea any motive-purchase on his maxims, gladly entertains it in his thoughts, as it then fully reveals to him, and stamps on him, the feeling of the original nobility and state of his rank. How different are the inward phenomena when this order is inverted! The idea of a Supreme Governor, imposing upon us duties of His law, lies primordially at an incomputable distance, and is observed, when we set out with it, to damp and dash man's courage—which, however, is of the very essence of all virtue—and the godliness is exposed to the risk of sliding into an abject, servile, and adulatory submission to the will of a despot. The energetic valor aroused, set free, and disengaged by virtue, encouraging and enabling mankind to trust confidently to his own resources, is likewise capable of becoming fortified and made inexpugnably secure when followed up by a doctrine of expurgation, announcing an amnesty for that in past transgressions beyond man's power to undo or counteract; whereas even here, were this ethical order transposed, then must inevitably doubt as to the appropriation of the *grace* unnerve and break the spirits: abortive expiations to make what has been done undone then creep in: doctrines of our utter inability to perform of ourselves any spontaneous ingenuous good, follow in their train; these, by begetting anxious and uneasy apprehensions touching his possible lapse backward into evil, transplant the unhappy sufferer into a whining, whimpering, passive moral state, incapable of aiming at anything either great or good—only of sighing after it with prayers or vows. In founding and uprearing a moral character, everything depends on the leading and dominant idea whereunto everything else must be subordinated. When to the worship of God is allotted the foremost place to which virtue is postponed, then is such *deity* an *idol*; for God is then an agent not to be won by good moral deportment executed in the world, but one whose approbation is to be gained by invocations and adulatory addresses: *religion* is now *idolatry*. Godliness can therefore never be a *surrogatum* of virtue, assisting us to dispense with it. Godliness can only be its plenary consummation, crowning it with the hope of that ultimate success which will one day put wholly within our grasp the chief and last end of all our moral labors.”

CORRECTIONS.—The reader will please note the following: In §12 (Vol. V., p. 31) for “Mr. Semple, the shrewd and masterly translator of the Ethics of Immanuel Kant, in his introduction to the *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der*

Sitten," read "Dr. Henry Calderwood, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, in his introduction to Semple's translation of Kant's *Ethics*." In §100 (Vol. VIII., p. 350) for "Semple," read "Calderwood." In §17 (Vol. V., p. 34) for "Mr. Semple," read "Dr. Calderwood." In §71 (Vol. V., p. 298) for "Apelles," read "Timanthes." In §67 (p. 296) for "judicial duty," read "juridical duty." In §75 (p. 301) last line, read [§24] instead of [§54].—J. E.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

On Pleasure and Pain.

[Dr. Brinton, writing editorially in the *Medical and Surgical Reporter*, discusses in recent numbers the subject of Pleasure and Pain. We quote here the greater part of the two articles which he devotes to it.—EDITOR].

When Socrates was about to drink the cup of hemlock, and the jailer had loosed the fetters which had galled his ankles, he rubbed them with a feeling of relief, and exclaimed to his disciples: "How singular is the thing called pleasure, and how curiously related to pain which might be thought to be the opposite of it: for they never come to man together, and yet, he who pursues either of them is generally compelled to accept the other also. They are two, and yet they grow together out of one head or stem. I cannot help thinking that if Æsop had noticed them, he would have devised a fable about some god trying to reconcile their strife, and when he could not, tying their heads together; and that is the reason why when one comes the other follows."

Such, according to the record in the *Phædo* of Plato, were the reflections of the greatest philosopher of Greece, on these discrepant sensations. Up to the present time so far as we can find, no satisfactory doctrine of their relations has been taught. Something much better than an Æsopian fable has indeed been brought forward to explain them. Theories, with more or less testimony to their truth, have been adduced. Pain, says Beclard, is an excess of the sense of touch: *Physiologie*, p. 883. It is, says another physiologist, hyperæsthesia of the sensory fibres. The lexicographers seem to have been puzzled with it. Professor Dunglison calls it "a disagreeable sensation which scarcely admits of definition." The *Dictionnaire des Sciences Medicales* gets over it by the convenient statement that it is so well known that to define it is superfluous! While Dr. Gardner in his